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As reimbursement rates decline or remain stagnant, an
increasing number of physicians are acquiring ownership interests
in freestanding health care facilities, such as ambulatory surgical
centers (ASCs), sleep disorder centers, and single-specialty
hospitals, including long-term acute care and rehabilitation
hospitals. These outpatient, freestanding facilities provide a means
for physicians to increase their earnings by sharing in the profits of
health care while also directly controlling the quality of care
delivered to their patients. Among other things, ownership and
joint ventures enable physicians to bill both for the professional
component and facility fee component of services rendered,
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increasing physician revenue opportunities.
The relationship between a hospital and its medical staff is
symbiotic. Physicians and hospitals have struggled to provide
services as the cost of providing health care has soared,
reimbursement has decreased, and health care is delivered in a
highly regulated environment. As physicians increasingly invest in
freestanding outpatient facilities, hospitals are questioning the
impact of this competition upon hospital revenue and the patient
base.
The growth in specialty hospitals and other freestanding
facilities has been controversial. In October 2003, the United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report to
Congress entitled “Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location,
1
Services Provided, and Financial Performance.” In this report, the
GAO found that seventy percent of the specialty hospitals it
2
reviewed had some degree of physician ownership. The GAO
noted that “21 out of 25 specialty hospitals treated a lower
percentage of patients who were severely ill compared with patients
in the same diagnosis categories treated at general hospitals in the
3
same urban areas.” The report also concluded that specialty
hospitals treated a smaller percentage of Medicaid patients than
4
general hospitals. These patients account for some of the lowest
levels of reimbursement.
Physician investment in specialty hospitals and other
freestanding healthcare providers has led many tertiary hospitals to
claim that the physicians owning freestanding healthcare facilities
are “cherry picking” the patients with less severe medical problems
and better insurance coverage, leaving the hospitals to contend
with the sicker patients with higher acuities who have Medicaid or
5
are uninsured. Not-for-profit and community hospitals usually do
not have the ability or desire to turn away patients based upon
ability to pay. Hospitals argue that physicians who invest in
freestanding facilities are diverting from the hospitals certain
procedures with higher reimbursement rates and lower costs,
1. GAO-04-167 (Oct., 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04167.pdf.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. Id. at 4.
5. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE
OF COMPETITION, 20-21 (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
healthcare/040723healthcarept.pdf.
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which in turn affects the ability of the hospitals to provide
emergency care and other essential services needed by the local
6
community.
The response by hospitals to the growth of ASCs and singlespecialty hospitals has been multi-fold. With hospital industry
backing, Congress included in last year’s Medicare Prescription
Drug legislation an eighteen month moratorium prohibiting a
physician from referring a patient to cardiac, orthopedic, or
surgical specialty hospitals in which the physician had an ownership
7
or investment interest. Hospitals have initiated or participated in
mutually beneficial partnerships or joint ventures with physicians,
within the limits set by the fraud and abuse regulations and the
restrictions imposed on tax-exempt institutions, to encourage
physicians to invest with the hospital instead of with potentially
8
competing freestanding facilities. Hospitals have also used their
market power to enter into exclusive contracts with payors to freeze
9
out specialty hospitals and/or ASCs from provider lists.
Hospitals have also responded to this perceived economic
threat by injecting economic factors into the credentialing process
10
and the grant of medical staff privileges to physicians.
These
hospitals are electing to impose penalties, including the loss of
medical staff privileges, upon physicians whose conduct is deemed
by the hospital administrators and governing bodies to be disloyal
or otherwise in conflict with the economic interests of the
11
hospitals.
Such “conflicts credentialing” occurs when a hospital considers
a physician’s relationship with other hospitals or freestanding
entities that compete with the hospital to which the physician is
12
seeking or maintaining medical staff privileges. Through conflicts
6. Id. at 21-22.
7. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 507, 117 Stat. 2066, 2295-97.
8. HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 32:2 (West, 2004).
9. See, e.g., Rome Ambulatory Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Rome Mem’l Hosp., No.
5:01-CV-23, at 4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004); supra note 5, at 23.
10. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASSOC., ORGANIZED MED. STAFF SECTION, ECONOMIC
CREDENTIALING,
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/bup/category
/10303.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); Judith E. Orie, Comment, Economic
Credentialing: BottomLine Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1998).
11. See infra Part II (discussing cases where hospitals have attempted to deny
or rescind staff privileges based on economic or conflict criteria).
12. Robert J. Milligan & Michelle Notrica, Plata o Plomo: Hospital Medical Staff
Relations in the Era of Conflicts Credentialing, 2 HEALTH LAWYERS WEEKLY 35, Sept. 3,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8
8MARKSMATCHINSKI.DOC

1012

3/13/2005 4:12:27 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

credentialing, hospitals seek to deny, rescind, or hinder the staff
privileges of physicians who invest in freestanding facilities that
hospitals perceive as competing for patients and revenues in the
relevant health care market.
The emerging practice of conflicts credentialing represents a
significant change in the economic and professional interests of
physicians and in the relationship between medical staffs and
hospitals. In this article, the authors explain the interrelationship
between the authority of hospitals and medical staffs to manage
their respective affairs and the legal developments that have led
13
toward conflicts credentialing.
The authors next discuss the
medical community’s reaction to conflicts credentialing and the
legal challenges facing the use of economic factors in physician
14
credentialing.
I.

MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING

Hospital medical staff privileges were typically granted to
physicians who were able to provide quality patient care and meet
all of the requisite education and licensure requirements. The
traditional perception was that training, experience, and general
practice were of primary importance in the credentialing process,
and hospital staff privileges were granted to physicians who
15
provided quality patient care.
Credentialing decisions were
historically based on quality considerations and a determination of
the applicant physician’s current clinical competence, for example,
appropriate medical training, unrestricted state licensure, medical
16
liability coverage, and an unrestricted federal DEA number. The
physician requesting privileges demonstrated the appropriate
education, training, experience, and expertise to exercise those
17
privileges.
In addition, physicians have maintained memberships on
multiple medical staffs to (1) treat patients at the facility offering
18
the best care and (2) accommodate cross coverage of patients.
2004, available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlw/issues/040903/print.cfm.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part III-IV.
15. See Letter from Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., American Medical Association, to
Ms. June Gibbs Brown, Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and
Human Services (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Hospitals have also been traditionally open to permitting qualified
local physicians to enjoy medical staff privileges at other hospitals;
tax exempt hospitals are generally required to maintain an “open
19
medical staff.”
20
Medical staff credentialing is governed by state laws, the
21
Medicare Conditions of Participation, and the accreditation
standards implemented by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
22
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). When hospitals, through
their medical staffs, utilize this approach, economic considerations
do not factor into the hospital’s credentialing process and
decisions. Physicians who are members of a hospital’s medical staff
usually are required by the hospital’s medical staff rules and
regulations, as a condition of their continued medical staff
membership, to serve on various hospital committees which may
include credentialing, bylaws, and institutional review board
committees that perform peer review and act primarily for the
23
benefit of the hospital.
The use of economic criteria by the hospital as part of the
credentialing process is a break from this traditional view and
reflects the financial pressures now facing both hospitals and
physicians. With economic credentialing, the hospital, either
directly or by amending the medical staff bylaws to include a
“conflicts policy,” interjects economic criteria into the decision to
24
grant or permit a physician to maintain staff privileges.
The
hospital provides the physician with a conflict of interest statement
or other questionnaires addressing the nature of the physician’s
25
relationship with other hospitals or health care entities.
This
19. Id.
20. Id. For example, Illinois law states that “all hospitals licensed under this
Act (Illinois Hospital Licensing Act), except county hospitals as defined in
subsection (c) of Section 15-1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, shall comply with,
and the medical staff bylaws of these hospitals shall include rules consistent with,
the provisions of this Section in granting, limiting, renewing, or denying medical
staff membership and clinical staff privileges.” 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.4(b)
(2004).
21. 42 C.F.R. § 482.12(a)(5) (2005).
22. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
Standards (JCAHO), MS 4.10-4.40 (2004), at http://www.jcaho.org/htba/
hospitals/facts.htm.
23. Id.
24. American Medical Association, Economic Credentialing, (explaining the
American Medical Association Policy H-230.975), at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/10303.html (last visited February 8, 2005).
25. See, e.g., Complaint ¶5, Murphy v. Baptist Health, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark.
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inquiry by the hospital may occur as part of the credentialing
process at the time the physician applies or reapplies for privileges,
or at any time that the physician is a member of the hospital’s
26
medical staff.
The hospital’s governing body reviews the physician’s
responses to the hospital’s written questions to determine if the
physician has a financial interest in a health care facility that
27
conflicts with the hospital. If a perceived financial conflict exists,
the hospital may deny the physician medical staff privileges or
remove the physician from the hospital’s medical staff if the
28
physician is an active medical staff member. Appeal rights are
29
often curtailed or non-existent.
II. THE EMERGING TREND FROM MEDICAL QUALIFICATIONS TO
ECONOMIC AND CONFLICTS CREDENTIALING
The advent of exclusive provider contracts between hospitals
and physicians signaled a departure from the use of medical
criteria to determine a physician’s clinical competence and
certification for staff privileges. Exclusive provider contracts arise
when a hospital contracts with an outside physician or physician
group to exclusively use certain hospital facilities, such as radiology
or emergency room units. Physicians who are not parties to the
exclusive provider contracts are denied privileges or their existing
privileges are limited or revoked to perform the medical services
that are being exclusively performed by physicians or the group
practice that entered into these contracts.
Physicians who were adversely affected by such contracts, and
denied or excluded from medical staff privileges as a result,
challenged the exclusive agreements as unreasonable restraints of
trade and on other theories. In most states, the courts found that
granting exclusive contracts was a legitimate exercise of a hospital’s
inherent right to conduct its independent business affairs and that
30
staff medical privileges were not an entitlement. Many courts, as
filed Feb. 24, 2004) (No. CV2004-2002).
26. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint ¶ 82, Med. Staff of Cmty. Mem’l
Hosp. of San Buenaventura v. Cmty. Mem’l Hosp. of San Buenaventura (Cal.
Super. Ct. 2003) (No. CIV 219107).
27. Id.
28. American Medical Association, supra note 24.
29. See Complaint ¶ 7, Murphy (No. CV2004-2002).
30. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., No. 95-2549, 1996 WL 498095, at *1
(4th Cir. N.C. Sept. 4, 1996) (per curiam); Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. Nat’l
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well as the Federal Trade Commission, have concluded that
exclusive contracts foster competition and enhance the delivery of
health care, outweighing the anti-competitive and exclusionary
aspects of the contracts on physicians who were denied staff
31
privileges.
There is no uniform definition of economic credentialing.
The American Medical Association (AMA) defines economic
credentialing as “the use of economic criteria unrelated to quality
of care or professional competence in determining a physician’s
qualifications for initial or continuing hospital medical staff
32
membership or privileges.” The term embodies a complete and
diverse set of practices that affect the staffing privileges of
physicians on economic grounds. As one expert explained:
Increasingly, physicians are evaluated on criteria such as:
number of patients treated, time allotted to each patient,
amount of insurance reimbursement received, number of
referrals and consultations, medication costs, liability
claims, patient satisfaction surveys, and other similar
economic factors. The terms “economic efficiency” and
“cost containment,” frequently touted by hospitals, are
33
merely euphemisms for economic credentialing.
The term “conflicts credentialing” is a new and more targeted
form of economic credentialing. It is not to be confused with a
“conflicts of interest” which precludes a partner or a corporate
officer from competing with the partnership or corporation.
Absent express medical staff bylaws to the contrary, physicians are
not agents of the hospital and hospitals generally resist the
34
suggestion or argument that physicians are agents of the hospital.
Rather, the concept of conflicts credentialing rests with those cases
Med. Enter., No. 87-3753, 1988 WL 46286, at *1 (4th Cir. May 10, 1988) (per
curiam); Redding v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 742 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. 2001); Dutta v. St. Francis Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 867 P.2d 1057 (Kan. 1994); Bartley v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992) (holding notice and hearing provisions not triggered by policy requiring
exclusive contracts); Vakil v. Anesthesiology Assoc. of Taunton, 744 N.E.2d 651
(Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Van Valkenburg v. Paracelsus Healthcare Corp., 606
N.W.2d 908 (N.D. 2000); Tenent Health Ltd. v. Zamora, 13 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000).
31. In re Burnham Hosp., 101 FED. TRADE COMMISSION 991 (1983).
32. American Medical Association, supra note 24.
33. Judith E. Orie, M.D., Economic Credentialing; Bottom Line Medical Care, 36
DUQ. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1998).
34. See Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1972); Espalin v.
Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 683-84 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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recognizing the right of a hospital’s board to exercise its business
judgment to run the business affairs of the hospital.
35
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s is one of the leading cases on the
topic of conflicts credentialing. In that case, the South Dakota
Supreme Court recognized the right of the hospital to use
economic criteria and potential conflicts to make credentialing
decisions without looking at a physician’s medical credentials or
36
abilities.
Avera St. Lukes (ASL) was a private, nonprofit hospital in
37
Aberdeen, South Dakota.
A group of orthopedic surgeons
formed Orthopedic Surgery Specialists (OSS) and built a day
38
surgery center to compete with ASL. In the first seven months of
OSS operation, “ASL suffered a 1000 hour loss of operating room
39
usage.”
In response, ASL’s Board of Trustees (the Board) passed two
resolutions: one “clos[ing] ASL’s medical staff with respect to
physicians requesting privileges” to perform certain spinal
procedures and the second “clos[ing] the medical staff to
applicants for orthopedic privileges except for two general
40
orthopedic surgeons being recruited by ASL.” In passing these
resolutions, the Board “specifically determined that the staff
closures were in the best interests of the Aberdeen community and
41
the surrounding area.” The closure did not affect the physicians
42
who had already been granted staff privileges.
43
Mahan was an orthopedic surgeon recruited by OSS. Mahan
applied for staff privileges at ASL after he began practicing at
44
OSS.
ASL denied Mahan’s request for privileges; subsequently
OSS and Mahan brought suit for breach of the medical staff
45
bylaws.
The trial court reasoned that “the Board had delegated . . .
authority concerning staff privileges to the medical staff,” and
therefore “no longer had the power to initiate actions that affected
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

2001 SD 9, 621 N.W. 2d 150 (S.D. 2001).
Id. ¶ 32, 621 N.W.2d at 160.
Id. ¶ 2, 621 N.W.2d at 152.
Id. ¶ 5, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
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46

the privileges of the medical staff.” The trial court found that “the
Board had breached its contract with the medical staff” when it
47
unilaterally closed staff privileges. The South Dakota Supreme
48
Court reversed.
The South Dakota Supreme Court reaffirmed that the bylaws
49
were an enforceable contract between the hospital and physicians,
but disagreed with the trial court’s determination of the language
50
and effect of that contract. The court reasoned that pursuant to
South Dakota law, “‘the affairs of a [non-profit] corporation shall
51
be managed by a board of directors,’” and that a hospital was
required to “have ‘a medical staff organized under bylaws and rules
approved by the governing body and responsible to the governing body
of the hospital for the quality of all medical care provided patients in
the hospital and for the ethical and professional practices of its
52
members.’” “[D]irectors ‘possess a large amount of discretionary
power within the limits of their legal authority, and in the exercise
53
In
of business judgment in the performance of their duties.’”
reversing the decision of the trial court, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that medical staff bylaws superseded the
54
Corporate Bylaws. Rather, the court reasoned that the medical
staff’s powers were derivative of the powers of the Board, and that
the medical staff bylaws “must originate from, and be authorized
55
by, the Board pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.” The Corporate
Bylaws specifically provided that “‘the business and the property of
the Corporation shall be managed and controlled, . . . by a Board
of Trustees’” and that “‘all the corporate powers . . . except such as
are otherwise provided for in these By Laws [sic] . . . shall be vested
in and shall be exercised by the Members of the Board of
56
Trustees.’” Therefore, the court concluded that “the medical staff
has no authority over any corporate decisions unless specifically
46. Id. ¶ 8, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 35, 621 N.W.2d at 161.
49. Id. ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d at 153-54.
50. See id. ¶¶ 31-32, 621 N.W.2d at 150.
51. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-23-13
(1989)) (alteration and emphasis in original).
52. Id. (quoting S.D. ADMIN. R. 44:04:04:02.01 (1995)) (emphasis in original).
53. Id. (quoting 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1486 (2004)).
54. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154-55.
55. Id. ¶ 17, 621 N.W.2d at 155.
56. Id. (quoting ST. LUKE’S MIDLAND REGIONAL MED. CENTER, CORPORATE
BYLAWS).
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58

granted that power in the Corporate Bylaws” or by statute, and
the Board had the “authority to make business decisions without
59
first consulting the medical staff.”
As the court noted, in closing staff privileges the Board had
specifically found that “the staff closures were in the Aberdeen
community’s best interests” and were necessary to preserve
60
profitable services at ASL.
The court reasoned that “[b]y
preserving the profitable neurological services at ASL, the Board
also insured that other unprofitable services would continue to be
61
offered in the Aberdeen area.” Therefore, the decision to close
the medical staff was within the discretion of the Board exercising
62
its business judgment. “[T]he courts should not interfere in the
internal politics and decision making of a private, nonprofit
hospital corporation when those decisions are made pursuant to its
63
Corporate Bylaws.”
Notably, Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s does not stand for the
proposition that the Board can indiscriminately interfere with or
impose credentialing decisions on economic grounds. The ASL
Board’s authority was grounded in the actual language of ASL’s
Corporate Bylaws and by state law. Further, the Board’s actions
only impacted future credentialing decisions. As such, the court
found little to distinguish the case before it with those decisions
upholding the authority of a hospital to enter into exclusive
provider contracts without the prior permission of the medical
64
staff.
The case did not address the authority of the Board to
terminate existing staff privileges or impose conflicts credentialing
on a retroactive basis.
The case of Medical Staff of Community Memorial Hospital of San
65
Buenaventura v. Community Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura
illustrates the limits of a board’s authority when it unilaterally
57. Id. ¶ 18, 621 N.W.2d at 155 (emphasis in original).
58. Id.
59. Id. ¶ 19, 621 N.W.2d at 156.
60. Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
61. Id. ¶ 20, 621 N.W.2d at 156.
62. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154.
63. Id. ¶ 20, 621 N.W.2d at 156.
64. Id. ¶ 26, 621 N.W.2d at 158.
65. No. CIV 219107 (Ventura County, Cal. Super. Ct.) (on file with author);
see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A Victory for Physicians, at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/13815.html (Aug. 23, 2004); see also Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, San Buenaventura (No. CIV 219107) (on file with
author).
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attempts to alter the medical staff bylaws and retroactively remove
the staff privileges of physicians. In Medical Staff of Community
Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura, the hospital sought to
unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws to, among other things,
establish a conflict of interest policy that required physicians to sign
a conflict of interest statement that purported to make staff
members ineligible for holding office if they had an ownership
interest in any entity engaged in a business that competed with the
66
hospital. The medical staff sued for breach of contract, claiming
that the amendments violated the medical staff bylaws, California
law, and constituted an unlawful interference with the role of the
67
medical staff in credentialing staff members.
The hospital moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
medical staff, as an unincorporated association, did not have
68
standing to sue the governing body of the hospital. The court
found that the medical staff had standing to bring the action on
69
behalf of the entire medical staff, but not the individual members.
The parties eventually settled after the medical director resigned,
with the hospital agreeing, among other things, that the medical
staff bylaws could not be amended or changed unilaterally by the
70
hospital administrator.
III. STATE AND MEDICAL ASSOCIATION RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS
CREDENTIALING
Twenty states have enacted legislation addressing whether and
how a hospital can consider economic factors in the credentialing
process. The content and the potential protection afforded
physicians by these statutes vary. Ten states permit hospitals to use
71
economic criteria in credentialing; whereas, ten other states and
the District of Columbia restrict hospitals from using economic
72
factors in credentialing decisions.
66. San Buenaventura, No. CIV 219107.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0191 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-7-7 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-21-2-5 (1996 & West Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE §
135B.7 (2001 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-431 (2002); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319 (1982 & Michie Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-85
(2002); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2005).
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087.28 (2002 & West Supp. 2005); COLO.
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The practice of conflicts credentialing has divided the medical
profession. The AMA and the American College of Medical
Quality (ACMQ) have both issued position statements opposing
the practice. “The AMA opposes the use of economic criteria not
related to quality to determine an individual physician’s
73
qualifications. . . .” The ACQM has declared that “[c]redentialing
[practices] must be the exclusive product of qualified and objective
peer review, utilizing criteria directly related to the quality of
patient care in which neither over nor under-utilization of medical
74
resources is accepted.”
Conversely, the American Hospital
Association (AHA) asserts that hospitals must be allowed to
establish policies necessary to protect the hospitals economic
75
interests.
Because JCAHO standards address the organization and
governance of the medical staff, they shape institutional
76
procedures related to credentialing.
The current JCAHO
standards anticipate medical staff self-governance which can be
implemented by the adoption of bylaws and rules regulating
77
medical staff activities. Importantly, the standards allow neither
the medical staff nor the governing board to unilaterally amend the
78
bylaws. However, hospital and other medical facility interests have
REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-507 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 413920 (Michie 2003); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/2(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37:1301 (1999 & West Supp. 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 51C (2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-17-52 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-205, §68-11-227 (2001 &
Supp. 2004); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.1015 (1999 & Vernon Supp.
2004-2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-134.1 (2004).
73. American Medical Association, Policy H-230.976 Economic Credentialing,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&
doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-230.976.HTM&s_t=H-230.976&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=
AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=1& (last visited Feb. 8,
2005).
74. American College of Medical Quality, Policy 19 Economic Credentialing
(adopted Nov. 13, 1997), available at http://www.acmq.org/profess/policy19.htm.
75. Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President, American Hospital
Association to The Honorable Janet Rehnquist, Office of Inspector General,
available at http://www.aha.org/aha/advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/comment/
2003/cl030205credential.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
76. See Judith J. Semo, Hospital-Medical Staff Relations: Strengthening Fragile
Relationships, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSLETTER, Dec. 2003,
available at http://www.asahq.org/newsletters/2003/12-03/semo.html.
77. JCAHO STANDARDS, MS 2.1, at http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/
perspectives.asp?durki=2837 &site=10&return=6063#d (effective date Jan. 7, 2002)
(“Medical staff bylaws and rules and regulations are adopted by the medical staff
and approved by the governing body before becoming effective.”).
78. Id. (“Neither body may unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws or
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recently begun to lobby JCAHO, arguing that facility boards should
have “absolute control over medical staff composition and
79
function.” The ability to unilaterally amend medical staff bylaws
80
would follow from such increased control. Despite the lobbying
effort, JCAHO recently proposed a rule that would authorize a
citation of noncompliance where bylaws permitted unilateral
81
amendment.
If it is adopted, the JCAHO rule would be
82
retroactive to 2004.
IV. STATUTORY CHALLENGES TO PATIENT REFERRALS AND
CONFLICTS CREDENTIALING
Physicians have been largely unsuccessful at challenging the
rights of hospitals to enter into exclusive contracts or engage in
other forms of economic credentialing. Courts and the FTC have
both concluded that exclusive provider contracts have pro83
competitive effects that often improve the quality of patient care.
Further, physicians have had mixed success claiming that the
imposition of conflicts credentialing was a breach of
contract/bylaws between the physician and the hospital, especially
when the credentialing is only used prospectively to exclude
84
physicians from existing medical staffs.
Recently, medical associations and physician groups have
begun to challenge conflicts credentialing as violating the federal
85
anti-kickback statutes and anti-trust laws.
In this section, the
authors discuss applicable statutes that have most recently been
cited and two current cases where physicians have had some initial
success at challenging the retroactive imposition of conflicts
credentialing.

rules and regulations.”).
79. See Semo supra note 76.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
84. See Mahan v. Avera St. Lukes, 2001 SD 9, 621 N.W.2d 150 (2001); see also
supra text accompanying notes 35-64.
85. See Murphy v. Baptist Health, CV 2004-2002 (using anti-kickback laws to
challenge implementation of conflicts credentialing); Biddulph et. al. v. HCA, Inc.
& E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., Case No. CV-04-1219 (using antitrust laws to
challenge conflicts credentialing).
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A. Challenging Conflicts Credentialing with the Federal Anti-Kickback
Statute: Are Staff Privileges “Remuneration”?
86

The federal Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits the knowing and
willful offer, solicitation, payment or receipt of any remuneration
in return for or in order to induce either any referral for items or
services covered under any federal health care program, or the
87
purchase, lease or ordering of such items or services.
For
purposes of the Anti-Kickback Statute, a “federal health care
program” is defined to include a broad range of federally-funded
health care programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE,
CHAMPUS, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and
programs funded by Maternal and Child Health Block Grants or
88
Social Services Block Grants.
The intent of the Anti-Kickback Statute is to prohibit the direct
or indirect receipt and payment of remuneration in connection
with the referral of patients and activities related to the acquisition
of goods, facilities, services and other items paid for by the federal
89
health care program.
On December 2, 1999, the AMA requested that the Health and
Human Services-Office of Inspector General (OIG) publish a fraud
and abuse alert on the practice of exclusive or conflict
90
credentialing. In that letter, the AMA asserted that medical staff
privileges were a form of remuneration and complained that the
practice of exclusive or conflicts credentialing:
requires physicians seeking medical staff membership and
privileges at a specific hospital to agree to admit patients
exclusively or principally in a specific hospital only if they
agree to refer all or most of their patients to that hospital.
Some exclusive credentialing policies go further,
prohibiting medical staff members from any association
(investment, employment or contractual) with facilities
that compete with the hospital, even if the competing
facility would be the better choice from a quality of care
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
87. Id.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (2000); Rules and Regulations, 64 Fed.
Reg. 63518, 63538-39 (Nov. 19, 1999).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
90. Letter from AMA to OIG dated December 2, 1999 (on file with author).
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91

perspective.
The AMA supplemented this request in a second letter to the OIG
92
in September 2002.
In response, the OIG issued a request for public comments
regarding the development of possible guidance addressing certain
93
credentialing practices.
The OIG’s Solicitation of Public
Comments on Certain Credentialing Practices referred to the
AMA’s concern that “an increasing number of hospitals are
refusing to grant staff privileges to physicians who (1) own or have
other financial interests in, or leadership positions with, competing
health care entities, (2) refer to competing health care entities, or
(3) fail to admit some specified percentage of their patients to the
94
hospital.”
The OIG recognized the historical precedent that the denial
of a physician’s hospital privileges was “rarely actionable” under the
95
Federal Anti-Kickback laws. The OIG also noted the increase of
physician ownership in freestanding facilities, and stated, “[t]hese
physicians may be in a position to steer profitable business or
patients to their own competing business through their control of
96
referrals.”
The OIG reasoned that “a credentialing policy that
categorically refuses privileges to physicians with significant conflict
of interest would not appear to implicate that [A]nti-[K]ickback
97
[S]tatute in most situations.” However, the OIG stated its concern
that “discretionary decision-making” could raise certain AntiKickback risks.
Several credentialing practices have been brought to our
attention that give the privilege-granting hospital
discretion to evaluate the “financial conflict” created by a
physician’s outside business interests and permit the
91. Id.
92. See Letter from Michael D. Maves, AMA to Kevin G. McAnaney, Chief,
OIG (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/
pub/upload/mm/395/ sept_ltr_oig.doc; see also William B. Monnig, Report of the
Organized Medical Staff Section Governing Council, I-04 REPORT B (AMA, Chicago, IL),
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/21/i04rep-b.doc
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2005) (providing a timeline of AMA/OIG communications on
“economic and exclusive credentialing”).
93. Annual Comment Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 72894 (Dec. 9, 2002).
94. Id. at 72895.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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physician to retain privileges subject to periodic review.
Such discretionary decision-making appears to raise
substantial risks under the [A]nti-[K]ickback [S]tatute
(i.e., privileges are conditioned on a sufficient flow of
98
referred business).
The OIG also noted that some hospitals were conditioning
privileges on referrals other than the minimum necessary for
99
clinical proficiency. The OIG concluded that privileges can be
remuneration and that certain types of credentialing decisions can
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute: “Certain medical staff
credentialing practices may implicate the [A]nti-[K]ickback
[S]tatute. For example, conditioning privileges on a particular
number of referrals or requiring the performance of a particular
number of procedures, beyond volumes necessary to ensure clinical
100
proficiency, potentially raise substantial risks under the statute.”
Whether privileges were remuneration, and whether a hospital’s
use of conflicts credentialing could be justified under certain
circumstances, were therefore important considerations in
determining whether conflicts credentialing could violate the AntiKickback Statute.
The AMA and the AHA both provided comments in response
to the OIG’s solicitation. The organizations took conflicting
positions on a number of issues, including whether hospital
privileges constituted remuneration under the Anti-Kickback
Statute. The AHA argued that privileges were remuneration and
“do not involve the transfer of something of value from a hospital
101
to a physician.”
As the AHA stated in response to the OIG’s
solicitation for comments:
In granting privileges . . . a hospital transfers no cash or
any equivalent in-kind benefit to the physician. Rather, to
the extent a physician receives an economic benefit
related to hospitalized patients, that benefit derives solely
from the payment made to the physician’s patient or
his/her insurer for professional services rendered. There
is no remuneration, in cash or in kind, from the hospital,
which neither provides patient referrals nor performs the
102
income-generating services.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 72896.
Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 32012, 32023 (June 8, 2004).
Letter from Rick Pollack to Janet Rehnquist, supra note 75.
Id.
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The AMA reasoned, on the other hand, that privileges were
remuneration: “Clinical privileges are crucial to physicians.
Without clinical privileges, physicians cannot admit patients to a
hospital for treatment. Most, if not all, physicians cannot practice
medicine effectively without the ability to admit patients to a
hospital when necessary or to provide consultation when
103
requested.”
The Anti-Kickback Statute does not provide a private right of
action. The Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal and civil
penalties for individuals and entities that violate the statute unless
the payment and receipt of “remuneration” fits into a safe harbor
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of
104
Health and Human Services (DHHS).
Each offense under the
Anti-Kickback Statute is punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 and
105
imprisonment for up to five years.
Violators are also subject to
exclusion from the federal health care program upon a
determination of violation by the DHHS regardless of whether a
106
criminal conviction has been obtained.
Prior to 1997, the OIG did not have the authority to impose
civil penalties upon violators and the OIG entered into significant
monetary settlements with individuals and entities under
investigation for potential violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
However, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress amended the
civil monetary provisions to allow DHHS to recover treble damages
107
plus $50,000 for each violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Even though the statute does not provide for a private right of
action, the Anti-Kickback Statute can be used to challenge conflict
credentialing policies. Courts have held that contracts that
contravene the Ant-Kickback statute violate public policy and are
therefore unenforceable, “irrespective of whether anyone can be
prosecuted criminally (or civilly) in connection with that
108
agreement.”
Consistent with the statutory language, courts have
interpreted the definition of remuneration broadly: “The text
103. Letter from Michael D. Maves, AMA, to Janet Rehnquist, OIG (Feb. 6,
2003) (on file with author).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6)(i).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (current version).
108. Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Serv., Inc., 926 F.
Supp. 835, 843 (E.D. Ark. 1996); see also Zimmer, Inc., v. Nu Tech Med., Inc., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 850, 863 (N.D. Ind. 1999).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8
8MARKSMATCHINSKI.DOC

1026

3/13/2005 4:12:27 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

refers to ‘any remuneration.’ That includes not only sums for
which no actual service was performed but also those amounts for
which some professional time was expended. ‘Remunerates’ is
109
defined as ‘to pay an equivalent for service.’” The Anti-Kickback
Statute may provide a basis for challenging conflicts credentialing
in those circumstances in which the courts find that physician
privileges are a form of remuneration.
Such a legal theory is being pursued in a case pending before
110
the Arkansas Supreme Court. In Murphy v. Baptist Health,
plaintiffs used federal and state anti-kickback laws to challenge the
unilateral implementation of conflicts credentialing.
Baptist
Health Medical Center is a general purpose hospital that is part of
the Baptist Health medical system. The plaintiff physicians have
staff privileges at Baptist Health and also shareholders of the Little
111
Rock Cardiology Clinic.
The clinic in turn owned a minority
ownership interest in the Arkansas Heart Hospital, a competitor of
112
Baptist Health.
Baptist Health adopted a conflict policy which required
professional staff members to disclose direct or indirect interests in
competing hospitals and declared that any physician with such an
113
interest was ineligible for initial or renewed appointment.
The
credentialing policy further provided that any physician granted
privileges “who subsequently acquires or holds an ownership
interest or investment interest in a competing hospital,
immediately ceases to be qualified to hold appointment or clinical
114
In 2004, Baptist Health notified
privileges at Baptist Health. . . .”
the plaintiff physicians that their ownership interest disqualified
them from staff appointments and privileges and that effective in
the near future they would not permitted to schedule future
115
procedures or appointments at the hospital.
The physicians sued, alleging that the Baptist Health policy
116
violated the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, by creating a system of
109. United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1966)).
110. Murphy v. Baptist Health, No. CV2004-2002, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark. filed
Feb. 24, 2004).
111. Id.
112. Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 3, Murphy (No. CV2004-2002).
113. Id. ¶ 5.
114. Id. ¶ 7.
115. Id. ¶ 15.
116. Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud
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rewarding appointments and privileges to physicians in exchange
for increased referrals to Baptist Health, which “constitutes offering
and paying prohibited indirect remuneration to physicians in
117
exchange for these referrals. . . .” The physician plaintiffs sought
to enjoin implementation of such credentialing as contrary to
federal law and interfering with their relationships with patients
118
and with referring physicians.
In response to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
Baptist Hospital relied on Mahan v. Avera St. Lukes’ and argued that
it was in the best interests of the community for the doctors to not
be extended staff privileges at Baptist because the loss of loss of
patients would jeopardize the other non-profit functions of the
119
hospital.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction,
holding that the granting of privileges to physicians under the facts
alleged by plaintiffs did appear to be a violation of the federal anti120
kick back laws and other statutes cited by the plaintiffs. The case
is currently on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
B. Challenging Conflicts Credentialing Through Anti-Trust Law
121

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide an additional
basis for challenging conflicts credentialing policies. Significant
legal and factual hurdles exist, however, with respect to the
application of either section of the Sherman Act.
To prevail under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff
must establish the existence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
This requires the existence of multiple parties capable of entering
122
into a conspiracy.
Whether a hospital and its staff are distinct
123
Some
entities capable of conspiring varies among jurisdictions.
jurisdictions view the medical staff itself as a group of distinct
Act, the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act, the Arkansas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and two common law theories. Id.
117. Id. ¶ 29.
118. Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 54-55.
119. Murphy v. Baptist Health, CV 2004-2002, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark. Mar. 22,
2004) (order granting preliminary injunction).
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1- 2 (2000).
122. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-72
(1984).
123. Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 814-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding
hospital and staff were one entity and as a matter of law could not conspire with
each other), with Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir.
1990) (finding hospital and its staff were separate entities capable of conspiring).
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124

individuals capable of conspiring among themselves.
To bring a section 2 Sherman Act claim, the plaintiff claiming
monopolization or attempted monopolization must be a
competitor of the hospital or consumer of the hospital’s services to
125
have standing to bring the claim. Additionally, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the hospital possessed the intent to
126
monopolize.
The failure to prevail on one section of the
Sherman Act is not determinative of the ability to prevail on the
other.
The use of the Sherman Act to challenge conflicts
credentialing is illustrated in the matter of Biddulph/Mountain View
127
Hospital v. HCA/Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center,
currently
pending in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District in
Idaho. In that case, the Trustees of an Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center (EIRMC), a community hospital located in Idaho
Falls, unilaterally adopted a Medical Staff Development Plan
128
(MSDP) that purported to “supplement” the medical staff bylaws.
The MSDP required physicians to disclose financial relationships or
investment in competing facilities and empowered the board to
remove a “practitioner’s appointment and clinical privileges . . . if
the [Trustees determine] by objective criteria that a practitioner is
diverting patients to other facilities. . . for reasons related to that
129
practitioner’s financial or other gain.”
In 2003, without prior notice, the board voted to terminate five
physicians with staff privileges at EIRMC who were also substantial
investors in Mountain View Hospital (Mountain View), a twentybed-surgical-andobstetric hospital established by several local
130
physicians.
In response, Mountain View and four of the five
allegedly conflicted physicians filed an eight-count complaint in
state court, alleging breach of contract, tortuous interference with
124. Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1990).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820
F.2d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding party could not maintain action against
alleged monopolist because party was neither provider nor consumer of offered
services).
126. See White, 820 F.2d at 104 (holding that one of the elements of Section 2 is
a “willful acquisition” of monopoly power).
127. Biddulph v. HCA, Inc., No. CV-04-1219 (D. Idaho filed Aug, 6, 2004).
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see IDAHO CODE § 48-104 (2004) (“A contract, combination, or
conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable restrain of Idaho
commerce is unlawful.”).
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prospective economic advantage, and two counts under the Idaho
131
Competition Act (conspiracy to adopt anti-competitive policies
132
and attempted monopolization).
The plaintiffs alleged that the
MSDP was an anti-competitive policy targeting new hospitals in the
133
Idaho Falls area.
134
Reasoning that the Idaho Competition Act was substantially
similar to the Federal Sherman Act, the trial court looked to
federal law to determine whether the plaintiffs could state a claim
135
for conspiracy or attempted monopolization.
The trial court
dismissed the section 1 conspiracy claim, reasoning that the board
136
The trial court, however, refused
could not conspire with itself.
137
to dismiss the section 2 monopolization claim.
In the Sherman Act section 2 claim, the plaintiffs’ alleged that
the MSDP was an anti-competitive policy targeting new hospitals in
138
the Idaho Falls area.
EIRMC argued that it could refuse to deal
139
Plaintiffs’ asserted that a
with competitors as a matter of law.
refusal to deal violated section 2 if the actor was a conceded
140
monopolist.
The court, in denying the motion to dismiss,
reasoned that the plaintiffs had alleged facts raising an issue as to
whether EIRMC had monopoly power in the Idaho Falls market
and whether EIRMC was willfully using such power in adopting and
131. Id.; see IDAHO CODE §48-105 (2004) (“It is unlawful to monopolize, attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize any line of Idaho
commerce.”).
132. Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 27.
133. Id.
134. IDAHO CODE § 48-104 (2004).
135. See id. § 48-102(3) (directing court to utilize the interpretation of federal
statutes in interpreting comparable Idaho statutes in the absence of reported
Idaho appellate decisions). Here, the court looked to federal case law from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 23-24.
136. In so reasoning, the trial court looked to whether one of the decision
makers sat on the board or was a member of the medical staff. Biddulph, CV-041219, at 25-27. Although many circuits have held that a hospital cannot conspire
with its medical staff, other courts have held that medical staff members could
conspire with the hospital because medical staff members are generally not
officers or directors of the hospital. Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786,
814-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding medical staff could conspire with hospital), with
Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
medical staff could not conspire with hospital). Whether the medical staff can
conspire with the hospital therefore depends on whether the members are
considered officers or directors of the hospital.
137. Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 31-32.
138. Id. at 27.
139. Id. at 28.
140. Id. at 28-29.
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141

implementing the MSDP in 2002 through 2004.
The case has
142
been set for trial and the parties are engaged in discovery.
V. CONCLUSION
Continued reductions in the Medicare-physician-fee schedule
and payment for health care will increase competition for health
care dollars. Reduced reimbursement and increased competition
for patients will also continue to create tension between hospitals
and their medical staff. Physicians will position themselves as
competitors to hospitals as they seek to increase their revenues
through ownership in freestanding facilities and joint ventures with
hospitals. In some markets, hospitals will have no choice but to
allow physicians to compete against them because utilizing a
conflict of interest credentialing policy would drive physicians to
competing hospitals. In other markets, hospitals will succeed in
using conflict of interest credentialing policies as a method of
improving the hospital’s strategic position and preserving its
economic viability.
Conflicts and other forms of economic credentialing will only
increase as community and other general hospitals compete with
freestanding healthcare facilities. Although hospitals have the
power to implement economic credentialing in certain
circumstances, the manner and method of how this is done
depends on a number of factors, including the terms of the
corporate bylaws, state statutes, and whether the credentialing is
done prospectively or is meant as a mechanism to retroactively
remove or punish alleged competing physicians. The law in this
area is far from settled and it will continue to evolve as physicians
and hospitals deliver patient care in a highly regulated
environment while facing rising health care costs and declining
reimbursement.

141.
142.

Id.
Biddulph v. HCA, Inc., ROA Report (on file with author).
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